Red flags for trade finance, importers and exporters

Trade paperwork can carry value across borders. Mismatches between invoices, goods and payments are the signal reviewers look for.

A red flag is a reason to look closer, not a finding. The duty is to report suspicion to the national financial intelligence unit, never to confront a customer. See reporting and suspicious activity. Which techniques belong under which industry is an editorial grouping; each indicator below is reproduced from the technique page that sources it.

What supervisors and standard-setters expect

The FATF and Egmont Group of financial intelligence units call trade-based money laundering one of the most complex and widely used methods, because criminals use legitimate trade to disguise and move proceeds. Their March 2021 risk indicators report groups warning signs under four heads: the structure of the business, trade activity, trade documents and commodities, and account and transaction activity.

In the US and UK texts reviewed, binding duties fall on banks and other financial institutions, not ordinary importers and exporters. UK regulation 18 requires regulated firms to assess risk by customer, geography, product, transaction and delivery channel, and keep a written record. In the US, a bank must file a suspicious activity report for a transaction of at least $5,000 that it knows or suspects involves illegal funds or has no apparent lawful purpose, within 30 calendar days of detection (60 at most if no suspect is identified). The US examiners' manual adds that trade finance is document-based, that goods may be over- or under-valued to move value, and that an issuing bank should learn the identity, business and funding sources of applicants and beneficiaries. Industry practice follows the Wolfsberg, ICC and BAFT Trade Finance Principles, extended on March 27, 2019 to open account trade and bank-to-bank trade loans.

The latest large action shows what failure looks like. On October 13, 2026, Treasury announced a $1.2 billion FinCEN penalty, a $750 million OCC penalty and an $11.6 million OFAC settlement against Bank of America. FinCEN found over $5 billion in suspicious transactions not reported on time, including more than $1 billion involving priority risks such as potential trade-based money laundering with a southwest border link. The OCC found that, after a December 2024 order, the bank still processed potential trade-based money laundering because of a systemic monitoring gap. Treasury said the bank leaned on law enforcement inquiries instead of its own controls, and red flags went unaddressed even after compliance staff escalated them.

Mapping the page's red flags to these duties gives a practical test. Prices far from market, or goods that do not fit the customer's business, are failures of customer due diligence about what the customer really does. Reliance on payments from unknown third parties is a gap Treasury cited. Repeated letter of credit amendments belong to document review, where examiners expect banks to understand the paperwork. Volumes out of proportion to the company are a monitoring question, and the reporting clock starts at detection.

As of October 2026: Checked October 21, 2026. The Treasury release does not describe trade finance failures beyond the references to potential trade-based money laundering, and the Bank of America matter is a recent, admitted and settled action; details may be refined in the underlying consent orders, which were not read. The Wolfsberg, ICC and BAFT principles text itself was not opened, only the 2019 announcement, so their contents are not described. The statement that importers and exporters are not themselves obliged covers only the US and UK texts consulted, not every jurisdiction.

Red flags by technique

Trade based money laundering (TBML)

Layering
  • Invoice prices far above or below the market value of the goods shipped
  • Goods that make no sense for the customer's stated line of business
  • Payments to an exporter arriving from third parties unrelated to the buyer
  • Circuitous shipping routes or transshipment through countries with no role in the deal
  • Letters of credit repeatedly amended or extended without a clear commercial reason
  • Trade volumes out of proportion to the size and history of the company

Black Market Peso Exchange

Layering
  • US exporters paid by third parties (brokers, exchange houses, or strangers) rather than by their actual customer
  • Export invoices settled with many structured cash deposits made in different cities or states
  • Importers who route payment through a broker instead of their own bank and cannot explain why
  • Goods retailing in Latin America below any plausible cost of importing them
  • Funnel accounts: cash deposited across multiple states, withdrawn rapidly somewhere else
  • Cash-heavy garment, electronics, or appliance wholesalers whose deposits dwarf their walk-in trade

Mirror trading

Layering
  • Buy and sell orders in the same security, at the same time, in the same size and at the same price, placed for two related customers in different currencies
  • Customers linked by shared directors, owners, employees, or addresses, especially when one side is offshore
  • Trading that has no chance of profit or loss and generates unusually little commission
  • Trading volumes that are far out of line with a customer's profile or stated business
  • Customers acting as intermediaries for undisclosed underlying clients, with ownership evidence that is unverified
  • Trades placed through one office but booked to the books of another, with weak oversight of the booking office
  • Outside inquiries about a customer's wires that go unanswered, or are answered without detail

Sources

  1. Trade-Based Money Laundering: Risk Indicators (FATF and the Egmont Group, March 11, 2021).
  2. FFIEC BSA/AML Manual: Trade Finance Activities (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Current manual page, read October 2026).
  3. 31 CFR 1020.320, Reports by banks of suspicious transactions (US Department of the Treasury (FinCEN), via Cornell LII, Current text, read October 2026).
  4. The Money Laundering Regulations 2017, regulation 18 (risk assessment) (UK Government (legislation.gov.uk), Revised text current to October 2026).
  5. International trade organizations release additional compliance guidance for trade transactions (The Wolfsberg Group, March 27, 2019).
  6. U.S. Treasury Announces Record Enforcement Actions Against Bank of America (US Department of the Treasury, October 13, 2026).