Red flags for securities firms and insurers

Brokerage accounts and insurance policies hold and move value in ways that look like ordinary investing or saving.

A red flag is a reason to look closer, not a finding. The duty is to report suspicion to the national financial intelligence unit, never to confront a customer. See reporting and suspicious activity. Which techniques belong under which industry is an editorial grouping; each indicator below is reproduced from the technique page that sources it.

What supervisors and standard-setters expect

The FATF's 2018 life insurance guidance is candid that many life products are not flexible enough to be a launderer's first choice and that the sector's risk is generally lower than for other financial products. It still says premiums may be paid with criminal proceeds, and that each insurer's assessment should reflect its size, complexity and products, with senior management involved.

In the US, 31 CFR 1023.210 requires a broker-dealer to keep a written anti-money laundering program approved by senior management, with internal controls, a compliance officer, ongoing training and independent testing. It also requires risk-based customer due diligence: understanding the nature and purpose of each relationship to build a risk profile, ongoing monitoring, and identifying the beneficial owners of legal entity customers. A suspicious activity report is due for transactions of at least $5,000, within 30 calendar days of initial detection. In the EU, Regulation 2024/1624 treats investment firms, life and investment-related insurers and the intermediaries that sell life policies as financial institutions, applies from 10 July 2027, and requires due diligence at account opening, for occasional transactions of at least €10,000, and always on suspicion. Its recitals say that where due diligence cannot be completed on a life policy, an insurer may freeze the relationship and withhold the payout instead of terminating.

Recent US cases involve monitoring that did not cover the business. On March 6, 2026, FinCEN assessed $80 million against Canaccord Genuity, the largest Bank Secrecy Act penalty on a broker-dealer. It found an under-resourced program, poorly designed surveillance reports, at least 160 unfiled suspicious activity reports across dozens of over-the-counter securities, and weaknesses its regulator had flagged for years. On August 3, 2026, FINRA fined UBS Financial Services $20 million: from January 2019 to June 2023 more than 60,000 foreign currency wires worth over $10 billion were not adequately monitored, an automated tool omitted about 33% of wires in certain retail accounts, and the failing repeated a 2018 case.

The page's red flags line up with these duties. Offshore or nominee accounts test beneficial ownership checks on entity customers. Quick deposit and sale of thinly traded shares, or proceeds sent to third parties, are what surveillance must flag, and the reporting clock runs from detection. Oversized single premiums, early cancellations and payouts to unrelated parties for insurers test source-of-funds understanding and the beneficiary checks. The enforcement lesson is coverage: a flag only counts if the data feeds the monitoring that raises it.

As of October 2026: Checked October 21, 2026. Both enforcement actions are settlements; FINRA's UBS finding was accepted without admitting or denying, while Canaccord admitted its facts. A separate FinCEN penalty on UBS was mentioned in secondary coverage but not verified, so it is not stated here. The US insurance company program rule (31 CFR 1025.210) and the FATF securities guidance of October 26, 2018 were read but are not described in detail. UK and Canadian securities rules are not covered. EU Regulation 2024/1624 is not yet in application. Rule 3310 itself was not opened; the FINRA release names it.

Red flags by technique

Securities and brokerage

LayeringIntegration
  • Accounts held by offshore companies or nominees whose real owners cannot be identified
  • Shares deposited and then sold almost immediately, especially in low-priced, thinly traded stocks
  • Matched trades, pre-arranged trades, or wash trades with no change in beneficial ownership
  • One account or group dominating the volume of a stock, or trading at the close to move the price
  • Large volume in a stock that had barely traded for months, with sharp price moves and no news
  • Sale proceeds sent to a different country, third party, or account than the one that traded

Mirror trading

Layering
  • Buy and sell orders in the same security, at the same time, in the same size and at the same price, placed for two related customers in different currencies
  • Customers linked by shared directors, owners, employees, or addresses, especially when one side is offshore
  • Trading that has no chance of profit or loss and generates unusually little commission
  • Trading volumes that are far out of line with a customer's profile or stated business
  • Customers acting as intermediaries for undisclosed underlying clients, with ownership evidence that is unverified
  • Trades placed through one office but booked to the books of another, with weak oversight of the booking office
  • Outside inquiries about a customer's wires that go unanswered, or are answered without detail

Insurance products

LayeringIntegration
  • A large single premium, or a policy that is far bigger than the customer's needs or income would justify
  • Premiums paid with many money orders, cashier's checks, or cash equivalents bought at different banks or shops
  • Cancelling a policy soon after purchase, including in the free-look period, especially at a cost to the customer
  • Early or heavy borrowing against the policy, or a refund or loan cheque directed to an apparently unrelated third party
  • Premiums paid by someone with no obvious tie to the policyholder, or the benefit transferred to an unrelated third party
  • A customer who does not care about surrender charges or tax costs, and whose main interest is how fast money can come out

Sources

  1. Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: Life Insurance Sector (Financial Action Task Force, October 25, 2018).
  2. 31 CFR 1023.210, Anti-money laundering program requirements for brokers or dealers in securities (US Department of the Treasury (FinCEN), via Cornell LII, Current text, read October 2026).
  3. 31 CFR 1023.320, Reports by brokers or dealers in securities of suspicious transactions (US Department of the Treasury (FinCEN), via Cornell LII, Current text, read October 2026).
  4. Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, Articles 2 and 19 (European Union (EUR-Lex), May 31, 2024).
  5. FinCEN Assesses Historic $80 Million Penalty Against Canaccord Genuity LLC (FinCEN, March 6, 2026).
  6. FINRA Fines UBS Financial $20 Million for Anti-Money Laundering Violations (FINRA, August 3, 2026).